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Securities Law: Proxies Pull Mutual Funds into the
Sunlight: Mandatory Disclosure of Proxy Voting Records*
I. Introduction
In August 2003, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) imposed
a $750,000 fine on Deutsche Bank, an investment bank, for failing to disclose
to its mutual fund investors a material conflict of interest relating to its vote
on the proposed merger between Hewlett Packard (HP) and Compaq.'
Deutsche Bank had seventeen million proxies to vote on behalf of individuals
who had invested in its mutual funds that held HP stock.2 A majority vote of
HP shareholders, of whom 57% are institutional investors,3 was required for
the merger to succeed.
The shareholder vote became contentious as HP's Chief Executive Officer,
Carly Fiorina, and HP board member and son of HP's co-founder, Walter
Hewlett (Hewlett), publicly battled for shareholder support of their positions.4
Both Fiorina and Hewlett lobbied large shareholders, especially institutional
* The author would like to thank Professor Steven J. Cleveland for his assistance with the
preparation of this note.
1. Ina Fried, Deutsche Bank Resolves HP Merger Issue (Aug. 19, 2003), at http:llnews.
com.com/2100- 1014_3-5065555.html; see also SECBrings Settled EnforcementAction Against
Deutsche Bank Investment Advisory Unit in Connection with Its Voting of Client Proxies for
Merger Transaction; Imposes $750,000 Penalty (Aug. 19, 2003), at http://www.sec.gov/
news/press/2003- 100.htm [hereinafter SEC Brings Settled Enforcement Action].
2. SEC Brings Settled Enforcement Action, supra note 1. As discussed later in detail,
shareholders of public companies have the right to vote on matters affecting the corporation.
When an individual invests in a mutual fund managed by an investment company, the duty to
vote is delegated to the mutual fund, whose management serves as the "proxy" for the true
owner of the shares. The term "proxy" is defined in federal securities laws as a "consent"; the
term is also used to describe the permission to vote on another's behalf, as well as the statement
discussing shareholder proposals issued by the corporation in preparation for the shareholders'
meeting. See General Rules and Regulations, Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-l(f) (2003).
3. Louise Kehoe & Scott Morrison, Fiorina Comes a Step Closer to Making the
Connection: Shareholders Face Big Decision on Deal, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2002, at 26. The
term "institutional investor" typically refers to mutual funds or pension funds, which are
corporate entities that trade securities in large volumes on behalf of others.
4. Fiorina forecasted that the merger would be the key to HP's long-term growth. Hewlett
opposed the merger, arguing that the move would reduce HP's stock price. Hewlett acted on
behalf of the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation and the William R. Hewlett Revocable
Trust, which together own more than 18% of HP's stock. Kehoe & Morrison, supra note 3.
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investors, for support.5 Ultimately, shareholders approved the merger, by a
vote of 51% to 49%, with a margin of only forty-five million votes.6
The SEC initiated an investigation into Deutsche Bank's vote after a
California newspaper leaked a voicemail from Fiorina.7 In her message to HP
Chief Financial Officer Bob Wayman, Fiorina stated that HP might "have to
do something extraordinary" to capture the votes of the shares held by
Deutsche Bank.' Deutsche Bank's investment banking arm was already
working with HP on financing related to the merger and earning fees for this
effort.9 Further, a lawsuit filed by Hewlett immediately after the shareholder
vote alleged that Deutsche Bank had already voted its shares against the
merger when individuals from its commercial banking division intervened and
initiated a meeting between HP management and the individuals responsible
for voting the proxies."0 Subsequently, Deutsche Bank changed its votes to
support the merger."
Although the SEC's investigation did not determine that Deutsche Bank's
relationship with HP affected its vote for the merger,'" and the Hewlett lawsuit
5. Id. Both Fiorina and Hewlett lobbied Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), the
third-party proxy research firm, for its recommendation; clients of ISS owned 23% of HP's
stock. Id. One such client was Barclays Global Investors, which had pledged to vote its sixty
million shares in accordance with the ISS recommendation. Hewlett v. Hewlett-Packard Co.,
No. 19513-NC, 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 35, at *34 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2002). Fiorina and Hewlett
each made two visits to ISS analyst Ram Kumar, who was responsible for determining ISS's
recommendation. John Haberstroh, Activist Institutional Investors, Shareholder Primacy, and
the HP-Compaq Merger, 24 HAMLINE J. PUB. L & POL'Y 65, 87-88 (2002).
6. Ariana Eunjung Cha, Deutsche Bank Pays $750,000 in SEC Settlement, WASH. POST,
Aug. 20, 2003, at El.
7. John Markoff, U.S. Agencies Looking into Hewlett Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2002,
at Cl.
8. Id.
9. See Cha, supra note 6 (reporting that the SEC had found that Deutsche Bank received
$1 million for "market intelligence" relating to the merger, and was to receive an additional $1
million at the successful completion of the transaction); see also SEC Brings Settled
Enforcement Action, supra note 1.
10. See Hewlett, 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 35, at **2-3.
11. See id. The SEC, in its administrative proceeding, found that after Deutsche Bank had
voted its proxies, two members of the investment banking side of the bank had intervened on
HP's behalf. The SEC stated that "[a] reasonable advisory client would want to know that its
fiduciary, which was called upon to vote client proxies on a merger, had been contacted by
officials of its affiliated investment bank in connection with an engagement directly related to
the subject of the proxy vote." Deutsche Asset Management, Investment Advisers Act of 1940,
Release No. 2160, 2003 SEC LEXIS 1977, at **10- 11. Based on Deutsche Bank's failure to
disclose, the SEC found that Deutsche Bank had "willfully violated Section 206(2) of the
Investment Advisers Act." Id. at * 11.
12. DeutscheAsset Management, 2003 SEC LEXIS 1977, at* 11. The SEC determined that
Deutsche Bank should have disclosed its conflict of interest to shareholders on whose behalf
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was dismissed, 3 the conflict of interest identified by the SEC in this case
illustrates the types of conflicts that have given rise to new SEC regulations.
Two of these regulations specifically address the process and procedure for
voting client proxies. The first clarifies the fiduciary obligation of voting
proxies in the best interests of an investment adviser's clients. The second
regulation requires mutual funds to disclose their proxy voting policies and
procedures, as well as their actual votes on specific proposals. 14 The SEC
described its rationale for the new regulations as the ongoing quest for greater
transparency and as a means "to prevent material conflicts of interest from
affecting the manner in which advisers vote clients' proxies."15
This note discusses the new proxy disclosure rules as proposed and adopted
by the SEC in early 2003, and ultimately argues that the rules are a relatively
cost-effective means to combat conflicts of interest in the mutual fund
industry. Part II examines the changing nature of institutional investors and
how the rise of such investment, along with the structure of mutual funds,
have caused the SEC to conclude that the current regulations fail to protect
individual investors. Part Im reviews the labyrinth of securities and proxy
regulation at the state and federal levels. In addition, Part HI examines the
new proxy disclosure regulations in greater detail, as well as the comments
that these regulations generated from the financial services industry. Part IV
argues that the proxy disclosure regulations will do little to benefit the
individual shareholder, but dismissing these regulations on this basis alone
would be premature. Further, Part IV briefly looks at these regulations in light
of long-held and emerging beliefs about law and economics, and concludes
Deutsche Bank voted by proxy, but stated that there was no requirement to show client harm to
establish a violation of the Advisers Act. Id. at *10. Consequently, the SEC did not opine
whether the votes were made in the best interest of Deutsche Bank's clients. Id. at *11. The
lack of disclosure alone creates the violation because, without it, clients cannot decide whether
to retain the adviser or use other means to protect their interests. SEC v. Capital Gains Research
Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 196 (1963).
13. The Delaware Chancery Court was disconcerted by the fact that Deutsche's investment
banking division initiated the meeting between the Proxy Working Group and HP management
and found this to "raise[] clear questions about the integrity of the internal ethical wall that
purportedly separates Deutsche Bank's asset management division from its commercial
division." Hewlett, 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 35, at **59-60. Despite this concern, the court found
that the evidence indicated the group's intent to vote in the best interest of individual investors.
Id.
14. Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, 68 Fed. Reg. 6585 (Feb. 7, 2003) [hereinafter
Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers]; Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting
Records by Registered Management Investment Companies, 68 Fed. Reg. 6564 (Feb. 7, 2003)
[hereinafter Disclosure of Proxy Voting].
15. Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, supra note 14, at 6585-86.
2004]
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that proxy disclosure is a relatively simple and cost-efficient way to deter
mutual fund advisers from voting against the clients' best interests.
II. Prelude to Mandatory Disclosure
A. The Changing Nature of Investors and Institutions
The image of individual shareholders in publicly held companies has slowly
faded away during recent decades as mutual funds have begun to play a
dominant role in individuals' investment strategies. 6 Traditionally, individual
investors were passive investors, employing a "hold or trade" policy. 7 If
shareholders disagreed with management, they would sell their shares.' In
contrast, if shareholders agreed with management decisions, they would
continue to hold their shares.19 The individual shareholder did not actively
participate in the governance of the corporation because of the significant
informational costs; a single shareholder would need to invest considerable
time and effort to learn about and monitor the corporation. Despite the
investment of time and effort, there was little chance that a single informed
shareholder, acting alone, could influence the corporation.2"
Mutual funds have the potential to change that dynamic. Mutual funds hold
about $2 trillion in publicly traded corporate equity,2' representing the
16. Stuart L. Gillan & Laura T. Starks, Corporate Governance Proposals and Shareholder
Activism: The Role of Institutional Investors, 57 J. FIN. ECON. 275, 278 (2000) [hereinafter
Gillan & Starks, Corporate Governance].
17. Stuart L. Gillan & Laura T. Starks, A Survey of Shareholder Activism: Motivation and
Empirical Evidence, CONTEMP. FIN. DiG., Autumn 1998, at 10.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Gillan & Starks, Corporate Governance, supra note 16, at 279. Adolf A. Berle and
Gardiner C. Means were the original theorists behind the "atomization" of ownership; they
hypothesized that individual shareholders were scattered geographically and could not easily
organize themselves to form a voting block. Accordingly, "no individual shareholders were
willing to invest the necessary time and effort to monitor management because their interest was
small and, if they did so, other shareholders would 'free ride' on their efforts." Robert W.
Hamilton, Corporate Governance in America 1950-2000: Major Changes but Uncertain
Benefits, 25 J. CoRP. L. 349, 350 (2000). Further, dissatisfied shareholders used the trade policy
and sold their stock, leaving only those shareholders who were supportive of management.
Consequently, "management was assured that shareholders would routinely approve
management proposals, and that as a practical matter, the power of shareholders to select
directors was purely theoretical." Id.
21. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OFTHE FED. RESERVE SYS., FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS OFTHE
UNITED STATES 90 (Dec. 5, 2002), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/zl/
20021205/zl.pdf (estimating $2.005 trillion market value of mutual fund corporate equity
holdings and $10.960 trillion market value of all corporate equity issued at the end of the third
quarter of 2002). The Investment Company Institute found that equity fund assets totaled
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investment of more than ninety-five million individual investors.22 These
institutional shareholders have such immense holdings that they cannot
maintain a "hold or trade" policy; if a fund attempted to sell significant
numbers of shares on the market, the share price would drop in response.23
Because they cannot liquidate their holdings without suffering significant
financial losses, institutional investors are incentivized to monitor their
portfolio companies.
These monitoring activities typically focus on the governance of the
corporation as a mechanism to increase value and decrease risk.24 As with
individual shareholders, institutional investors use their proxy votes as the
principal way to influence the governance activities of a publicly traded
corporation.25 The growing recognition of the power of institutional investors
is illustrated by the shift of assets to mutual funds that encourage shareholder
activism.26 The number of regulations adopted by the SEC that attempt to
$2.667 trillion on December 31, 2002. INVESTMENT CO. INST., MuTUALFUND FACT BOOK 23
(2003), available at http://www.ici.org/stats/mf/2003_factbook.pdf [hereinafter MuTUALFUND
FACT BOOK].
22. MUTUAL FUND FACT BOOK, supra note 21, at 41.
23. Gillan & Starks, Corporate Governance, supra note 16, at 278.
24. See Roberto Newell & Gregory Wilson, A Premium for Good Governance, MCKINSEY
Q., Summer 2002, at 20 (finding that institutional investors are, on average, willing to spend
more to acquire a stake in a company with strong governance values and practices). The extent
of an institution's involvement in governance activities varies. For example, pension funds,
such as CalPERS (California Public Employees' Retirement System), are better known for their
activism than corporate funds. See Douglas M. Branson, Corporate Governance "Reform" and
the New Corporate Social Responsibility, 62 U. PITT L. REv. 605, 633 (2001).
25. E-mail from Diane Tod South, Director of Social Research, Citizens Funds, to Jonathan
G. Katz, Secretary, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (Dec. 3, 2002), at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73602/dtsouth 1txt (observing that "proxy voting... is the
primary forum through which shareowners participate in the governance of a corporation, and
through which corporate management seeks affirmation and approval from shareowners").
26. See, e.g., Jerry Guidera, Shareholder Activists Win Two Big Ones, WALL ST. J., May
9, 2002, at Cl; Alison Maitland, Social Concerns Edge into the Mainstream, FIN. TIMES, Sept.
29, 2003, at 2. In addition, the Social Investment Forum (SIF), a membership organization for
socially responsible investment funds or funds that maintain a greater focus on shareholder
advocacy, found in its 2001 survey that assets managed by such funds exceeded $2 trillion, a
36% increase from its last biennial survey. In its 2003 survey, funds under management by
socially responsible investment entities increased by 7% while, on average, funds under
management decreased by 4% overall. SIF also tracked a 15% increase in shareholder proxies,
another indicator of shareholder activism. Finally, SIF documented that assets involved in
socially responsible investing, including shareholder advocacy, have increased 40% faster than
all assets under professional management between 1995 and 2003. SIF, 2003 REPORT ON
SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTING TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES i-ii, available at
http://www.socialinvest.org/areas/researchl-trends/sri-trends-report_2003.pdf (last updated
Dec. 2003).
2004]
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combine the financial benefits of mutual funds with their increasing authority
in matters of corporate governance further demonstrate the potential mutual
funds hold for increased shareholder value.27
B. The Structure of Mutual Funds
Mutual funds have grown in importance as investment vehicles for
individuals who have entered the financial markets.2" Mutual funds invest in
diverse securities to offer investors a reduction in risk without a significant
reduction in their return on investment.29 When individuals invest in mutual
funds, they use one vehicle to acquire a stake in potentially hundreds of
different companies depending on the diversity of the particular fund's
holdings.30 Individuals receive a pro rata stake in the individual holdings of
the fund based on the amount of their investment in the fund and receive the
benefit of a professional investment manager for a fee.3 '
A portfolio with holdings in a large number of companies in different
industries decreases the risk of investment because companies are affected
differently by changes in the economy. During the recent period of "irrational
exuberance" in the stock market,32 an individual who had invested solely in a
27. See Matthew R. Morey, Testimony Before the House Subcommittee on Government
Efficiency and Financial Management (Apr. 20, 2004), at http://reform.house.gov/Uploaded
Files/Morey%20Testimony%20-%2OApril%2020,%202004.pdf (encouraging greater funding
for SEC enforcement and more regulations on the frequency and form of disclosure, and stating
that SEC funding "does not take into consideration that the importance of funds has
dramatically increased since 1990").
28. Alan R. Palmiter, Mutual Fund Voting of Portfolio Shares: Why Not Disclose?, 23
CARDOZO L. REv. 1419, 1427 (2002).
29. MUTUAL FUND FACT BOOK, supra note 21, at 3.
30. For example, the Growth Fund of America (the Growth Fund), managed by the
American Funds, held equity in 189 companies as of June 30, 2003. See GROWTH FUND OF
AMERICA PROSPECTUS (Nov. 1, 2003), available at http://www.americanfunds.comlpdf/
shareholder/gfa-010_gfap.pdf. The prospectus is also available through the SEC's Electronic
Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval System (EDGAR), at http:llwww.sec.gov/Archives/
edgar/data/44201/000004420103000005/gfa485b.txt [hereinafter GROWTH FUND OF AMERICA
PROSPECTUS].
31. An investor pays an annual fee to invest in a mutual fund. This fee covers the costs of
managing the fund and other administrative costs, such as accounting, clerical, and filing costs.
The amount of the fee is typically assessed as a percentage of the total assets held by the fund.
MUTUAL FUND FACT BOOK, supra note 21, at 3, 15.
32. Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Federal Reserve, coined this phrase during a speech
at the American Enterprise Institute to describe the overvaluation of the stock market.
Greenspan asked, "[H]ow do we know when irrational exuberance has unduly escalated asset
values ... ?" Alan Greenspan, Remarks at the Annual Dinner and Francis Boyer Lecture of the
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (Dec. 5, 1996), at http://www.
federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/1996/19961205.htm.
692
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technology fund suffered significantly greater losses than an investor who had
invested in a fund that held other stock along with its technology shares.33 In
this way, diversification protects an individual investor from downturns in any
one industry. Also, by placing an investment in a fund with thousands or
millions of other investors, individuals are able to acquire a small stake in a
large number of companies, which effectively shelters their investment from
some market fluctuation. 4  In addition, an investor may reduce risk by
investing in a number of different funds, as various funds have different
investment strategies and invest in different types of securities. There are
funds that invest solely in bonds, those that seek aggressive growth, and others
that focus on regular dividends.3" The variety of mutual fund offerings, all
using the principle of diversification, is another advantage mutual funds offer
investors.
C. Conflicts of Interest
The effectiveness of mutual funds in reducing risk has caused them to
become one of the principal ways in which investors participate in financial
markets.36 As the amount of money under management at mutual funds
continues to grow, commentators and investment professionals warn investors
33. A brief look at the performance history of funds offered by Fidelity demonstrates that
risk can be reduced if an investment is spread among a variety of companies and industries. The
Oppenheimer Emerging Technologies Fund, which invests solely in the technology sector,
shows a one-year average return of 59%, while the average return over the life of the fund is a
negative 31.4%. In contrast, Fidelity's Value Fund, which invests in more than 280 companies
across ten major market sectors, has a one-year return on investment of 18% and a ten-year
average of 11.3%. Another way of comparing risk is to look at a fund's "beta" value, a measure
of the fund's volatility compared to the market as a whole. A beta of 1.0 indicates that a fund
tracks the changes in the market overall - when the market goes up, the fund goes up. As of
August 31, 2003, Oppenheimer's Emerging Technology Fund had a beta of 2.06, indicating
extreme volatility, while Fidelity's Value Fund had a beta of 0.75, indicating less sensitivity to
market changes. See Fidelity Investments, at http://www.fidelity.com (last visited Nov. 23,
2004).
34. For example, the Growth Fund has over 2.6 million investors and holdings in almost
200 companies. The Growth Fund's largest holdings are in the semiconductor and media
industries, in which it invests 19.6% and 9.8%, respectively, of the fund's assets. Within each
industry, however, the Growth Fund holds the stock of numerous companies. For example,
within the media industry, the Growth Fund invests 3.3% of its assets in AOL Time Warner,
1.8% in Viacom, and 0.53% in Fox Entertainment Group. GROwTH FUND OF AMERICA
PROSPECTUS, supra note 30.
35. SECTION OFBUS. LAW, AM. BAR ASS'N, A FIDUCIARY'S GUIDE TO FEDERALSECURITIES
LAws 254-55 (1994).
36. See Christopher B. Bernard, Toward an International Market in Mutual Funds, 36 VA.
J. INT'L L. 467, 468 (discussing diversification and risk reduction as primary motivators for
mutual fund investment).
69320041
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of the potential weaknesses of mutual fund accountability.37 As the example
of Deutsche Bank illustrates, the organization of a mutual fund may
incentivize fund boards or advisers to act in ways that do not promote
shareholder value.
A mutual fund is registered as either a corporation or a trust,38 but differs
from these entities because it is "organized and operated by people whose
primary loyalty and pecuniary interest lies outside the enterprise."39
Technically, a mutual fund has no employees of its own, but instead is
organized and managed by a separate "sponsor," which, along with
independent contractors, provides all services necessary for the fund's
operation. 4' The sponsor may be a bank, insurance firm, financial services
firm, or securities broker." The sponsor employs and compensates any and
all officers of the fund, including the board of directors. 2
This structure may result in significant conflicts of interest, most notably
where the fund's sponsor has business relationships with the companies held
in the fund's portfolio.4 3 In the case of the HP-Compaq merger, Deutsche
Bank's investment banking division had a contract with HP for merger-related
services and would earn an additional $1 million upon the merger's
completion." At the same time, Deutsche Asset Management was earning
fees from investors for managing shares of HP stock in its mutual fund
holdings, shares that had voting rights that Deutsche exercised in support of
the merger.45
A mutual fund's management of the retirement plan assets of a company
whose stock is also held in that mutual fund is another example of an inherent
conflict. For example, Fidelity Investments voted against a shareholder
proposal requesting that Tyco International maintain a majority of
37. See, e.g., Sara Hansard, Conference Call - Bogle: Big Investor Should Use Clout to
Curb Fund Abuses, INVESTMENT NEWS, May 13, 2002, at 18; Palmiter, supra note 28, at 1468-
69.
38. MuTUALFUND FACT BOOK, supra note 21, at 1.
39. Div. OF INVESTMENT MGMT., U.S. SEC, PROTECTING INVESTORS: A HALF-CENTURY
OF INVESTMENT COMPANY REGULATION 251 (1992).
40. Id. at 251 n.3.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. The classic example, as with Deutsche Bank, is a mutual fund managed by an
investment bank that also provides services to portfolio companies. Investment banking fees
can be much more lucrative than investment advisory fees. Congress recognized these conflicts
when it passed the Investment Company Act of 1940 and created a system of "corporate
democracy" to combat the abuses arising from conflicts of interest. Id. at 251-52.
44. Deutsche Asset Management, Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Release No. 2160,
2003 SEC LEXIS 1977, at *4.
45. See Cha, supra note 6.
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independent board members.' At the time of the vote, Fidelity was managing
Tyco's employment benefit plan and was earning millions of dollars in fees
for this service.47  In the aftermath of the corporate scandal at Tyco,
4
Fidelity's vote may lend credence to the assertion that mutual funds have
inherent conflicts of interests that must be mitigated through regulation or
other mechanisms.
IlL. Mutual Fund Regulation and Regulation of Proxy Voting: Old and New
These conflicts illustrate the source of increased concern about the
sufficiency of mutual fund regulation. Currently, mutual funds are subject to
two layers of regulation, state and federal.
A. Proxy Voting Under State Law
State law governs shareholder voting rights and the prescribed method of
exercising shareholder franchise.49 The general rule governing the voting of
shares provides for one vote for each outstanding share on each matter before
the shareholders.50 By default, shareholders vote on significant matters, such
as those decisions outside of the ordinary course of business, including
mergers," sales of significant assets," and dissolution. 3  In addition,
shareholders vote annually to elect directors - their representatives within the
organization - who in turn select the officers of the corporation.54
In addition to establishing the items on which a shareholder is entitled to
vote, state law typically dictates the mechanics of a shareholder vote. State
law allows for individuals to delegate their voting rights to another by proxy. 5
In the case of mutual funds or other intermediaries, individual investors
46. Matthew Benjamin, Leaving the Little Guy Behind, U.S. NEWS&WORLDREP., Oct. 21,
2002, at 50.
47. Id.
48. Former CEO Dennis Kozlowski has been indicted on securities fraud charges and is
accused of looting the company of more than $600 million. Carrie Johnson, Judge Dismisses
Charge Against Ex-Tyco CEO; Fraud, Evasion Counts To Be Tried Separately, WASH. POST,
Nov. 3, 2004, at El.
49. Under Delaware General Corporation Law, a corporation may determine the voting
powers for each class of stock it issues. DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151 (a) (2003). This flexibility
is one attractive aspect of Delaware's corporate law. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL
R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 213 (1991).
50. DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212(a) (2001).
51. Id. § 251.
52. Id. § 271.
53. Id. § 275.
54. Id. § 141.
55. Id. § 212.
20041
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2004
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
implicitly or explicitly delegate voting rights to the fund itself.56  A
representative from the fund, typically the investment manager, votes the
proxies on behalf of the individuals invested in the fund. 7
B. Proxy Voting Under Federal Law
Although state law and corporate charters detail shareholder rights in
voting, securities law and the regulation of proxies remains federal law.
Congress passed most of the securities laws in the 1930s and 1940s in reaction
to the stock market crash in 1929.58 While federal securities law historically
has focused on disclosure, until the 2003 proxy voting and disclosure
regulations there was no mandatory disclosure of voting or other governance
activities.59 The Investment Company Act,6° which governs mutual funds, and
the Investment Advisers Act,6' which governs mutual funds and the individual
advisers within a fund, offered no guidance to either advisers or mutual funds
voting on behalf of individual shareholders.62
In contrast to federal securities law's lack of regulation concerning proxy
voting, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA),63
which governs employee benefit plans in the private sector, provides detailed
guidance on the fulfillment of fiduciary duties relating to proxies. ERISA
provides requirements as to voting, documenting votes, and monitoring
requirements for the mutual funds subject to the statute.' Indeed, one
56. Indeed, this is one of the benefits of investing in a mutual fund, as the informational
costs discussed above are borne by the mutual fund in exchange for the annual advisory fee.
See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
57. THOMAS P. LEMKE & GERALD T. LINs, REGULATION OF INVESTMENT ADVISERS
§ 2.02[16] (2001).
58. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963). In SEC v. Capital
Gains Research, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that a "fundamental purpose [of] these statutes,
was to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor [let the
buyer beware] ... ." Id. at 186. Each state also has its own securities laws, which focus largely
on sales practices and the prevention of fraud, as well as licensing issues. See Stefania A. Di
Trolio, Public Choice Theory, Federalism, and the Sunny Side to Blue-Sky Laws, 30 WM.
MrrCHELLL. REv. 1279, 1283-87 (2004).
59. Palmiter, supra note 28, at 1441.
60. 15 U.S.C. § 80a (2000).
61. Id. § 80b.
62. Until these new rules, guidance for investment advisers was limited to the SEC staffs
informal interpretation of the antifraud section of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. LEMKE
& LINS, supra note 57, § 2.02[a]; see also Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, supra note 14,
at 6585.
63. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000).
64. The Department of Labor issued an Interpretive Bulletin stating that the fiduciary duty
of managing assets under retirement plans includes the voting of proxies, and that fund
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challenge for mutual funds governed by both securities law and ERISA was
the different standard applied by each. The new regulations bring federal
securities law in line with the ERISA standards." The mandatory public
disclosure of individual proxy votes made by investment companies
emphasizes that voting client proxies and subsequently disclosing those votes
is a duty owed to individual investors.'
C. The New Regulations
In January 2003, the SEC adopted regulations governing (1) proxy voting
by registered investment advisers, and (2) the disclosure of voting policies and
actual votes cast by mutual funds.67 These changes affect three seminal bodies
of law for securities regulation: the Securities Act of 1933,68 the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934,69 and the Investment Company Act of 1940.70 By
managers are obligated to vote proxies on items that will affect the value of the plan.
Interpretive Bulletin Relating to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29
C.F.R. § 2509.94-2 (2003). Fiduciaries may delegate the duty of voting to a third party, but that
act alone does not relieve fiduciaries of their duty. Id. Rather, the fiduciary naming the
investment manager for the plan is required to monitor the performance of the manager,
including the manager's voting of client proxies. Id. Further, fulfillment of this monitoring
requirement mandates the appropriate documentation of proxy voting records. Id. Finally, the
Interpretive Bulletin stated that active monitoring and communication with corporate
management is "consistent with a fiduciary's obligations under ERISA where the responsible
fiduciary concludes that there is a reasonable expectation that such [activities] ... [are] likely
to enhance the value of the plan's investment .. " Id. Such expectations are reasonable when
investments are held for long-term growth, or when the size of a fund's holdings would make
the sale of the investment difficult. With some types of investments, such as index funds, the
Department of Labor stated that the "prudent exercise of proxy voting rights or other forms of
corporate monitoring... may be the only method available for attempting to enhance the value
of the portfolio." Id.
65. The SEC's rule on the voting of client proxies does not require plan fiduciaries to be
"activist," in contrast to the standard required by ERISA. See Proxy Voting by Investment
Advisers, supra note 14, at 6585, 6587.
66. Curiously, though, the regulation addressing disclosure is very similar to regulations
proposed by the SEC in 1978. See Proposed Rules Relating to Shareholder Communications,
Shareholder Participation in the Corporate Electoral Process and Corporate Governance,
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 14,970, 1978 SEC LEXIS 1127 (July 18, 1978). The
1978 proposal did not require disclose of actual votes, contrary to the urging of several
commentators, but did require that funds disclose the number of times they voted for and against
management. Id.
67. Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-6 (2003); Disclosure of
Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered Management Investment
Companies, 17 C.F.R. § 270.30b1-4.
68. 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2000).
69. Id. § 78a.
70. Id. § 80a.
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enacting these changes, the SEC now places the voting of proxies within an
adviser's duties of care and loyalty and requires greater disclosure on the part
of institutional investors. 7 The SEC stated that the amendments were
necessary to increase transparency in the market, which will instill confidence
in investors and may lead to an increase in shareholder value. 2
1. Regulation Governing Proxy Voting
The first of the two SEC regulations addresses the voting of client proxies
by investment advisers registered with the SEC.73 In this regulation, the SEC
clarifies the previous informal interpretation of the antifraud provisions of the
Advisers Act by expressly affirming that voting client proxies is indeed an
exercise of the investment adviser's fiduciary duty.74 The duty of care
mandates that advisers vote when their monitoring of corporate events dictates
action or when the benefits of voting outweigh the costs. 75 The duty of loyalty
requires advisers to vote proxies to maximize shareholder value, which is
considered to be in the clients' best interests.76
In addition to the confirmation of voting as a fiduciary duty, the regulation
requires each investment adviser to develop policies and procedures relating
to the voting of client proxies, particularly the steps the investment adviser
71. Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, supra note 14, at 6585.
72. Id.
73. The new rule mandating the creation of proxy voting policies and procedures may be
found at Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-6. The amendments to
Rule 204-2, which describes the record-keeping requirements, may be found at Records to be
Maintained by Investment Advisers, 17 C.F.R. § 275.204-2. Both are amendments to the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b.
74. Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, supra note 14, at 6585. In SEC v. Capital Gains
Research, the U.S. Supreme Court found that all investment advisers owe fiduciary duties to
their clients as a matter of law. The Court stated, "Courts have imposed upon a fiduciary an
affirmative duty of 'utmost good faith, and full and fair disclosure of all material facts .... '
SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 194 (1963) (quoting WILLIAM L.
PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 534-35 (2d ed. 1955)). This fiduciary duty did not extend to the
voting of client proxies until the SEC released the new regulations in January 2003. Proxy
Voting by Investment Advisers, supra note 14, at 6585.
75. Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, supra note 14, at 6585. The SEC clarifies that
in every instance a failure to vote would not constitute a violation of the adviser's fiduciary
duty. The agency further states that in some situations, the costs of voting a client's proxies, as
in the instance of foreign securities that might require travel or the expense of a translator to
vote, would outweigh the benefits of voting. Id. at 6587. The duty imposed under this rule
differs from ERISA, which seems to require the active solicitation of, support of, or opposition
to items up for shareholder votes. Id.
76. Id.
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should take in cases where there is a material conflict of interest.77 As
mentioned previously, these conflicts can arise where a financial services firm
earns revenue from both investment banking and mutual fund fees or where
an adviser is selected by management to oversee employer pension plans.78
The SEC does not provide approved methods to resolve conflicts but states
that following a predetermined policy of voting or relying on an independent
third party to vote are both appropriate means to insulate a voting decision
from the adviser's conflict of interest.79
In addition to the development of voting policies and the voting of proxies
in the best interests of an adviser's clients, an adviser must provide requesting
clients with a copy of the adviser's actual proxy votes."0 In contrast, the
regulation for investment companies, discussed in the following section,
mandates public disclosure of votes as a means to inform shareholders. 8'
2. Regulation Requiring the Disclosure of Proxy Votes
In addition to the regulation regarding proxy voting by investment advisers,
the SEC concurrently released a regulation specifically directed at investment
companies.82 Similar to the requirements for investment advisers, the SEC
now requires investment companies to develop and adopt proxy voting
policies, including the procedures that the fund will follow to reach a decision
77. 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-6. The regulations require advisers to provide clients with a
summary of the policy and to furnish a copy of the policy to clients upon request. Id. The final
rule also mandates record keeping of proxy materials. See Records to be Maintained by
Investment Advisers, 17 C.F.R. § 275.204-2.
78. See supra Part II.C.
79. Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, supra note 14, at 6585. The SEC recognizes that
many funds will retain or continue to retain third-party proxy services to comply with these
regulations. Id. at 6591.
80. 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-6. The SEC anticipates that this disclosure will be included in
the adviser's written brochure required under Rule 204-3 of the Investment Advisers Act of
1940. Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, supra note 14, at 6585, 6590.
81. See infra notes 82-89 and accompanying text. The SEC imposed the rule regarding
proxy voting on all advisers registered with the fund. For those with a comparatively small
number of clients, responding to client requests for specific votes will not present a significant
logistical challenge. For investment companies, the public posting of proxy votes is a more
efficient use of resources. Further, as stated in the release discussing the new regulations, the
SEC was concerned that requiring public disclosure of adviser votes would reveal client
holdings. Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, supra note 14, at 6585, 6590.
82. Disclosure of Proxy Voting, supra note 14, at 6564. Although the regulations will also
apply to other registered investment companies, such as closed-end investment companies and
insurance company accounts organized as investment companies, the regulations focused on
mutual funds, also known as open-end management investment companies. See Investment
Company Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-4, 80a-5(a)(1) (2000).
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on a shareholder resolution. 3 Mutual funds must disclose the policy to the
fund's shareholders, as well as the steps the mutual fund will take in cases
where a conflict of interest exists." Most controversially, the SEC regulation
requires mutual funds to disclose the fund's vote on each resolution for all
publicly traded companies held in the fund's portfolio. In conjunction with
these regulations, the SEC adopted a new form for annual reporting of the
complete proxy voting record, which must be filed with the agency.
85
As for the disclosure of a fund's votes on specific resolutions, the SEC
allows a fund to either post this information on its website or to furnish the
information to interested persons upon request.8 6 The SEC requires the
company to disclose the following: the company name, the shareholder
meeting date, a brief description of each resolution, whether the resolution
was proposed by shareholders or management, whether the fund voted for or
against the resolution, and whether the fund voted with or against
management.8 7 Finally, the SEC requires mutual funds to tell shareholders in
their annual and semiannual reports how shareholders can access a fund's
voting record. 8 In contrast to its proposed rule, the SEC elected not to require
funds to disclose and explain their rationale when the funds vote contrary to
their stated policies.8 9
D. Industry Response to the Proposed Regulations
After new rules are proposed, the SEC allows a public comment period
during which the agency accepts comments on and suggestions for the
proposed regulations. During the eleven-week period that the SEC provided
83. Disclosure of Proxy Voting, supra note 14, at 6564. The regulations require a fund's
initial registration statement, specifically the Statement of Additional Information (SAI), to
disclose a fund's proxy voting policies, and funds will file an annual report disclosing the actual
proxy votes. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. Form N-PX is the new, adopted form, and funds must provide a complete voting
record for the twelve-month period ending June 30 of each year. Id.
86. Id. The proposed rule would have required mutual funds to provide individuals with
a copy of voting records upon request. Disclosure of Proxy Voting, Policies and Proxy Voting
Record by Registered Management Investment Companies, 67 Fed. Reg. 60,828 (Sept. 26,
2002) [hereinafter Policies and Proxy Voting Record]. Thus, this initial proposal was identical
to the one provided for investment advisers. See supra notes 67-74 and accompanying text.
Individuals commenting on the proposed regulation were concerned about the bulk of material
that mutual funds would be required to mail to individuals requesting the record. Consequently,
the SEC offered funds the choice of means to comply with the disclosure requirements. Policies
and Proxy Voting Record, supra.
87. Policies and Proxy Voting Record, supra note 86.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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for comment on the proxy voting and voting disclosure regulations, the SEC
received approximately eight thousand letters and e-mails from individuals
and institutions.9 ° While the SEC characterized the response to the regulations
as "extraordinary," others were quick to point out that the number of
comments represented less than one percent of individual shareholders in the
United States. 9'
The SEC received few comments on the proposal to expressly define the
voting of client proxies as a fiduciary duty; the majority of comments involved
the disclosure requirement.92 Further, the proposed rule would have required
mutual funds to disclose any conflict that existed between their votes and their
voting policies, a requirement vociferously opposed by the investment
companies and trustees who submitted comments.93 That requirement was
deleted from the proposal when the SEC adopted the final regulation, but the
disclosure requirement remained.94
90. Id. From the samples of letters provided by the SEC, more than 90% of the eight
thousand letters were form letters or variations thereof in support of the regulations. See
Comments on Proposed Rule: Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records
by Registered Management Investment Companies, at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/
s73602.shtml (last visited Aug. 20, 2004) [hereinafter Comments on Proposed Rule].
91. Comments on Proposed Rule, supra note 90.
92. Id.
93. Id.; see, e.g., Comment Letter of John E. Pelletier, Senior Vice President/General
Counsel, CDC IXIS Asset Management Advisers, L.P.; Executive Vice President/General
Counsel, CDC IXIS Asset Management Services, Inc., to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (Dec. 6, 2002), at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed-
s73602/jepelletierl.htm ("Disclosure of the fund's actual voting record will be harmful to the
fund and its shareholders. Disclosure of a fund's voting record would subject the proxy voting
process for funds to outside pressures from, among others, company management and special
interest groups."); see also Comment Letter of Domenick Pugliese, Senior Vice President,
Alliance Fund Distributors, Inc., to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (Dec. 5,2002), athttp://www.sec.gov/rules/proposedls73602/dpugliesel.htm ("[I]t
is unclear to us how disclosure of the rationale for votes which are submitted contrary to the
voting policy would achieve the SEC's stated objective of controlling conflicts of interest. In
fact, we believe it will have unintended negative consequences. We further believe that this
disclosure will result in additional costs to fund shareholders, again with little or no benefit to
shareholders."); Comment Letter of Brian T. Zino, President, J. & W. Seligman & Co. and
Seligman Funds, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
(Dec. 6,2002), at http://www.sec. gov/rules/proposed/s73602/btzinol.htm("[W]e disagree with
those portions of the Commission's proposal that would require a fund to disclose publicly
information regarding how the fund voted each of its individual proxies, and to disclose publicly
those specific instances in which an actual vote differs from the fund's policies and the reason
thereof. These proposals, in our opinion, reflect an attempt to solve a problem which does not
exist.").
94. Disclosure of Proxy Voting, supra note 14, at 6566-67.
2004]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2004
OKLAHOMA L4W REVIEW
1. Those in Favor
The impetus behind these new regulations came from management
companies that advocate for shareholder activism. Domini Social Investments
(Domini), an investment company with more than $1.3 billion under
management, was one of the first companies to publicly disclose its proxy
voting policies, as well as the actual votes cast during the proxy season.95
Domini, in fact, initiated the rulemaking petition with the SEC that resulted
in these new regulations.96 Domini's comments represented the sentiment of
those writing in favor of the regulations. Primarily, Domini and other
supporters stressed the fiduciary obligation of voting proxies and asserted that
the discharge of the fiduciary duty must be "disclosed to the person(s) to
whom the duty is owed."97 Domini argued that the law supports transparency
in the discharge of fiduciary duties in other contexts and that the regulations
align the duties of private mutual fund managers with those subject to
ERISA. 98
Proponents of disclosure further argued that disclosure of the proxy votes
will mitigate the conflict of interest present when a mutual fund votes proxies
for a company for whom it also manages retirement assets.99 Disclosure will
increase the seriousness with which fund managers vote and will deter
managers from unilaterally "rubber stamping" management decisions." In
addition, proponents of the regulations argued that disclosure would allow
individuals to effectively evaluate the performance of their management
company and would support greater corporate governance by increasing a
corporation's responsiveness to institutional investor concerns.' O'
95. Through Domini's website, investors and members of the general public can review
upcoming and recently attended shareholder meetings, as well as Domini's votes on each of the
shareholder resolutions. DOMINISOCIALINvEsTMENTS, athttp:/lwww.domini.comlshareholder-
advocacy/Proxy-Voting/index.htm (last visited Aug. 20, 2004).
96. Comment Letter from Amy L. Domini, Founder and CEO, Domini Social Investments
LLC, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (Nov. 1,2002),
at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73602/aldominil.htm [hereinafter Comment Letter of
Domini].
97. Id.
98. Id.; see also Comment Letter from Thomas W. Grant, President, and Laurence A.
Shadek, Chairman, Pax World Management Corp., to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (Nov. 26, 2002), at http://www.sec.gov/ruleslproposed/
s73602/twgrantl .htm [hereinafter Comment Letter of Grant & Shadek].
99. Comment Letter of Domini, supra note 96.
100. Id.; see also Comment Letter of Grant & Shadek, supra note 98. But see infra Part
IV.A (arguing that without additional detail on the proxy voting record, the final regulation
requires information insufficient to judge whether management's decisions have been "rubber-
stamped").
101. Comment Letter of Domini, supra note 96.
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2. Those Against
A number of organizations countered the proponents' statements by arguing
against the disclosure of actual votes on shareholder proposals. The
Investment Company Institute (ICI), an association of investment companies
with approximately nine thousand mutual funds as members, provided
comments on the proposed regulations that are representative of many of the
mutual funds arguing against disclosure."n While ICI supported the
requirement that mutual funds adopt policies and procedures for conducting
their proxy voting, it strenuously opposed the requirement that mutual funds
disclose their actual votes on each proposal. 3
Those opposing disclosure, including ICI, raised two main points. The first
focused on shareholder demand; several funds stated that no client had ever
requested the funds' actual voting history. °" Without shareholder demand for
102. Comment Letter from Craig S. Tyle, General Counsel, Investment Company Institute,
to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (Dec. 6, 2002), at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73602/cstylel.htm. There were a number of mutual funds
and related organizations providing comments that supported the disclosure requirements. See
Comments of Deborah A. Lamb, Chair, U.S. Advocacy Committee, and Linda L. Rittenhouse,
Staff, AIMR Advocacy, Association for Investment Management and Research, to Jonathan G.
Katz, Secretary, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (Dec. 13, 2002), at http:llwww.
sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73602/dalambl .htm (stating AIMR's support for disclosure provided
that "there is no specific requirement to reveal, prior to the completion of the proxy voting
process, how the fund manager intends to vote on particular issues"); see also Comment Letter
from John A. Hill, Chairman, The Putnam Funds, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (Oct. 24, 2002), at http://www.sec.gov/ruleslproposedl
s73602/jahilll.htm. Many of those in favor of the requirement already provided proxy vote
information to their clients. TIAA-CREF, the retirement system for the education and academic
community, is known for its strong governance practices and extensive disclosure. Comment
Letter from Peter C. Clapman, Senior Vice President and Chief Counsel, Corporate Governance,
Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association of America/College Retirement and Equities Fund,
to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (Dec. 6, 2002), at
http:llwww.sec.govlruleslproposed/s73602/pcclapman1.htm [hereinafter Comment Letter of
Clapman]. TIAA-CREF argued against disclosure of actual votes, however, because of the
concern that disclosure may jeopardize its use of the vote to negotiate with the management of
portfolio companies. Id. Instead, TIAA-CREF proposed a summary disclosure that would
group votes by type and report in the aggregate. id.
103. Comment Letter of Clapman, supra note 102.
104. See, e.g., Comment Letter from Karl J. Ege, General Counsel and Secretary, Frank
Russell Investment Co. and Russell Insurance Funds, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (Dec. 5, 2002), at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposedl
s73602/kjegel.htm [hereinafter Comment Letter of Ege]; see also Comment Letter from
Dechert, Inc., to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (Dec.
9, 2002), at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73602/dechertl.htm; Comment Letter from
Robert D. Neary, Chairman of the Board and Independent Trustee, Armada Funds, to Jonathan
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this information, shareholders would be penalized, in the form of higher
administrative costs, for the costs involved in complying with the disclosure
requirement.'15 Goldman Sachs commented that shareholders would gain little
by having the actual voting records and that individual investors are in a poor
position to monitor funds using only this limited information."
The second primary argument from the financial services industry focused
on the role of the funds' boards of directors. Many opponents believed that
the boards should continue to be the appropriate overseers of the investment
advisers' fiduciary duties. 117 Several commentators argued that the new
regulations would undermine the existing oversight function of the funds'
boards.' 08 Similarly, opponents raised concerns that disclosure would serve
only "special interest" groups who might target funds or their boards for
pressure tactics"°9 based on their vote. Several funds argued that disclosure
would negatively impact the "quiet negotiations" used by mutual funds when
interacting with management on governance issues.I"0
G. Katz, Secretary, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (Dec. 4, 2002), at http://www.
sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73602/rdneary 1.htm.
105. Although some may disagree with the SEC's final decision, the SEC was cognizant of
costs to funds and shareholders and considered concerns about costs in shaping its requirements.
See Disclosure of Proxy Voting, supra note 14, at 6564, 6568. Arguably, if all mutual funds
are subjected to the same requirement, all funds will be equally penalized.
106. Comment Letter from Kaysie Uniacke, Managing Director, Investment Management
Division, Goldman, Sachs & Co., to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (Dec. 6, 2002), at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73602/kuniackel .htm.
107. See, e.g., Comment Letter from Paul G. Haaga, Jr., Executive Vice President, Capital
Research and Management Co., to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (Dec. 6, 2002), at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73602/pghaagal.htm.
108. Both those submitting comments and the SEC recognized that the funds' boards owe
investors fiduciary duties, which are then delegated to a fund's investment adviser or the fund
manager. The SEC further stated that the new regulations would work in tandem with the
existing role of the funds' boards. Disclosure of Proxy Voting, supra note 14, at 6568.
109. A number of funds were concerned about proxy voting becoming politicized. See, e.g.,
Comment Letter of Pelletier, supra note 91. The SEC recognized that politicization of voting
records or the targeting of firms for social campaigns based on votes for nonfinancial resolutions
were real concerns. Disclosure of Proxy Voting, supra note 14, at 6568. The SEC requested
its staff to report back to the agency about any "unintended consequences" of the regulation
before December 31, 2005. Id.
110. TIAA-CREF, with more than $249 billion under management and holdings in more
than five thousand companies, was concerned that "requiring complete vote by vote disclosure
could unintentionally undermine the effectiveness of fund fiduciaries in voting proxies by
discouraging nuanced voting and hampering productive private communications with portfolio
companies." Comment Letter of Clapman, supra note 102. This is certainly a legitimate
concern, but Domini uses shareholder proposals and negotiation without hindrance by the
disclosure of its efforts. See DOMINI SOC. INVESTMENTS, PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES AND
SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM (2003), available at http://www.domini.com/common/pdf/Proxy
[Vol. 57:687
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol57/iss3/7
NOTES
IV. Evaluation of the New Proxy Voting and Disclosure Rules
The SEC oversees a disclosure-based system of regulation, and the new
proxy voting regulations fit squarely within this framework."' For this
reason, the argument that proxy voting disclosure will not benefit individual
shareholders, while true, is not an indication that the regulations will be
ineffectual. The SEC has realized that mutual funds and other investment
companies can no longer rely on market forces to determine the correct level
of disclosure and has imposed these new regulations in recognition of this
market failure.' 2
A. Impact on Shareholders
The commentators who opposed disclosure focused on the benefit
conferred on individual investors; they argued that investors do not want the
information, have not requested the information in the past, and would not
know what to do with the disclosed information. 3 These arguments may be
correct. Individuals invest in mutual funds because they recognize that they
lack the time, expertise, or willingness to research individual stocks and
actively manage a portfolio of investments. These individuals may have
already determined that, rather than review voting records, they would prefer
to pay the advisory fee as a more effective use of resources. A number of
funds currently disclose their proxy voting records and other governance
activities, and if this disclosure were valued, investors would select these
VotingGuide2003.pdf.
111. See supra note 58; 15 U.S.C. § 80a (2000).
112. Palmiter, supra note 28, at 1469 (arguing that "mandatory disclosure, in the face of an
apparent market failure in an industry that proclaims the virtues of financial transparency, could
serve many purposes").
113. See, e.g., Comment Letter of Paul Doherty, Esq., et al., Independent Trustees and
Directors of the GCG Trust and the ING Funds, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission (Nov. 19, 2002), at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73602/
pdohertyl.htm (The "costs [of compliance] are unwarranted in the absence of, among other
evidence, a meaningful investor demand for this type of information .... [W]e are advised by
management of our funds that very few, if any, actual shareholders or investors have sought this
type of information."); Comment Letter of Robert G. Zack, Senior Vice President and General
Counsel, OppenheimerFunds, Inc., to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission (Dec. 2, 2002), at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73602
rgzackl.htm [hereinafter Comment Letter of Zack] ("As the Commission knows, this proposal
was not the result of demands by shareholders of investment companies. We believe that
shareholders of funds have little interest in such information and note that over the last three
years, our records show that we have received one request by a shareholder about portfolio
proxy voting .... ).
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funds for their initial investment."'4 In cases where investors are not aware of
or do not value disclosure, mutual funds could view the costs of compliance
as a penalty. ' 5
Shareholder demand, however, is not a principal driver of securities
regulation; one look at the expanse of forms and disclosures demonstrates that
investor demand is not the impetus behind most securities law." 6  If
shareholder demand motivated the SEC to enact these regulations, the
regulations would certainly fail to meet investor expectations. Individuals are
rational beings who consider relevant information in making decisions that
maximize their wealth.' ' 7  At some point, however, there is too much
information for an individual to incorporate into making a rational decision." 
8
114. A few examples include Domini Social Investments, Walden Asset Management, Pax
World Funds, and Trillium Asset Management.
115. Before these regulations, the SEC had informally confirmed that the voting of proxies
in the clients' interests fell under the antifraud provisions of the Investment Advisers Act of
1940. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. As a matter of good business practice, mutual
funds would likely maintain a record of proxy votes. In the age of technology, compiling this
information may not impose as great of a cost as some funds have argued. In addition, as with
other advisory and management fees, such costs would be shared among millions of investors.
Funds that currently disclose their proxy voting records do not have higher expense ratios than
those that do not. See Comment Letter from Adam Kanzer, General Counsel, Domini Social
Investments, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (Mar.
31, 2003), at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73602/akanzerl.htm; see also Comment
Letter from Mercer Bullard, Founder and President, Fund Democracy, to Jonathan G. Katz,
Secretary, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (Oct. 21, 2002), at http://www.sec.govl
ruleslproposed/s73602/mbullard.htm.
116. See Mutual Fund Regulation in the Next Millennium Symposium Panels, 44 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 463,464 (2001) (quoting a symposium participant who explained that the history
of securities law demonstrates that individual investors were not seen as the beneficiaries of
disclosed information: "William 0. Douglas, who later went on to become SEC chairman....
wrote that the point wasn't to make prospectuses something the average investor could
understand. It was, instead, to put a body of information into the marketplace through which
experienced professionals... could distill and provide to investors.").
117. Robert Prentice, Whither Securities Regulation? Some Behavioral Observations
Regarding Proposals for Its Future, 51 DuKE L. J. 1397, 1413 (2002) [hereinafter Prentice,
Behavioral Observations]; see also W. Kip Viscusi, Individual Rationality, Hazard Warnings,
and the Foundations of Tort Law, 48 RuTGERs L. REv. 625, 636 (1996) ("The foundation of
economic analysis of choice is based on the rationality of individual decision making.").
118. For a discussion of the evidence supporting and refuting individual rationality in the
marketplace, see Robert A. Prentice, The Case of the Irrational Auditor: A Behavioral Insight
into Securities Fraud Litigation, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 133, 139-81 (2000). For additional reading
on the impact of irrational investing on securities litigation, see Peter H. Huang, Moody
Investing and the Supreme Court: Rethinking Materiality of Information and Reasonableness
ofInvestors, University of Pennsylvania, Institute for Law and Economics Research Paper 03-36
(Dec. 10, 2003), at http://ssm.con-labstract.id=478421.
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Reviewing a fund's votes on hundreds of resolutions and board elections
would qualify as "information overload." '"9 Individuals will decide to exclude
certain information when making a decision because, after a certain point,
additional information renders decision making more difficult and time-
consuming. 20
The market provides investors with a tremendous amount of information;
mutual funds provide performance histories, investment policies, and
descriptions of the fund's management.121  Mutual funds collect the
information they provide investors along with market information about
companies in the funds' portfolios and information about the fund from
financial news or rating sources. Proxy voting records are unlikely to assist
investors in assessing the fund's management. According to the regulations,
the fund must disclose the name of the company, identify information on the
security voted, provide a brief description of the matter voted on and the
proposing party, state whether the fund voted on the matter, disclose how the
fund voted, and detail whether this vote was in favor of, or against,
management's position.'22
The information required by the new regulations adds very little to an
investor's resources for making an informed decision about the quality of fund
119. Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its Consequences for
Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 418-19 (2003) (arguing that there are two keys
to effective federal securities law: (1) disclosure, and (2) the effective use of disclosed
information; too much disclosure can be counterproductive if individuals cannot use the
information to make better decisions). Mutual funds can vote on thousands of resolutions
annually. For example, in its comments against disclosure of actual votes, Fidelity Funds stated
that the new regulations would require 180 funds to disclose 330,000 items on each disclosure
statement. Comment Letter of Eric D. Roiter, Senior Vice President and General Counsel,
Fidelity Management & Research Co., to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission (Dec. 6, 2002), at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73602/edroiter
1.htm [hereinafter Comment Letter of Roiter].
120. Herbert Simon pioneered the concept of "bounded rationality" half a century ago. He
postulated that cognitive resources are scarce, and to cope with making complex choices,
individuals will work with an amount of information that leads to a satisfactory decision, even
though it may not be the best decision. Individuals accept a satisfactory decision over the
optimal one as a trade off for investing fewer cognitive resources in decision making. See
Paredes, supra note 119, at 418-19.
121. The fund may provide these items voluntarily or as required disclosures. See, e.g.,
Form N- I A, the registration form for mutual funds promulgated under the Investment Company
Act, at http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formn-la.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2004).
122. Disclosure of Proxy Voting, supra note 14, at 6564, 6569. As mentioned previously,
the SEC elected not to require a fund to disclose when its vote was inconsistent with its stated
policies. Id. Interestingly, TIAA-CREF, a large pension fund-insurance company, commented
that individual investors would find this information more valuable than the disclosure of the
individual votes. Comment Letter of Clapman, supra note 102.
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management. For example, a yea or nay vote on a resolution nominating an
individual to a company's board of directors sheds little light on why a fund
voted that way. Investors would need to understand the industry, the
competitive environment of the industry, and trends within the industry to
begin to decipher the rationale for a specific vote. Unless an evaluation
consisted solely of reviewing whether a fund voted, or if investors were to
assume that all votes in favor of management are bad, this data is of little help
to investors. Such an evaluation would be ineffective and naive given the
strategic reasons for a fund to withhold its vote or vote a certain way on a
resolution that would not be apparent from a cursory review of a voting
record. Further, the SEC has recognized that there are cases where the costs
of voting would outweigh the benefits and explicitly stated that the failure to
vote would not constitute a breach of the adviser's fiduciary duty." 3
B. Impact on Mutual Funds
Although the disclosure of proxy voting records may not directly benefit
individual investors, investors will benefit from the regulations' impact on
mutual funds. Conflicts of interest within the financial services industry
present a real challenge to regulators, particularly where no disclosure rules
exist to police unethical and illegal behavior. Arguably, the market has not
dictated the necessary levels of disclosure, perhaps because mutual funds are
less vulnerable to market forces. As a result of the market's inability to police
mutual funds, the SEC has turned to regulation to force disclosure.
Conflicts of interest within mutual funds exist, and there are circumstances
where mutual fund advisers or directors have incentives to act in the financial
interests of the fund or the fund's sponsor. Where the largest mutual fund
company earned half of its $9.8 billion revenue through fees for managing
corporate retirement plans, a real conflict exists for mutual fund managers
who are evaluating proxy solicitations."2 4 As the founder of the Vanguard
Group stated, "These corporations whose shares we're voting are also the
source of our 401(k) and pension business. We don't want to offend the
corporations we own." 2' Without required disclosure of the voting record, a
mutual fund has no economic incentive to vote in the best interests of the
client because the mutual fund cannot be held accountable to shareholders.
Before the proxy disclosure rules, financial markets relied on competitive
forces to determine "optimal" levels of disclosure; theorists postulated that "if
123. See Disclosure of Proxy Voting, supra note 14, at 6575.
124. AFL-CIO, Five Excuses About Mutual Fund Proxy Voting Disclosure, at
http://www.funddemocracy.commutual%20Fund%20Excuses.htm (last visited Aug. 20,2004)
(discussing conflicts of interest, using Fidelity as an example and revenue figures from 2001).
125. Hansard, supra note 37, at 18.
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disclosure is worthwhile to investors, the firm can profit by providing it.', 126
This conclusion depends on an efficient market, one where stock prices reflect
all known information relating to the stock. 27 The assumption of efficient
capital markets, however, may no longer be sacrosanct; several commentators
have argued that the market may not operate efficiently with regard to mutual
funds. 2 s For example, investors do not withdraw from funds that are
underperforming, 129 continue to buy shares in funds with high expense
ratios,"' and approve increases in advisory fees when a fund's assets are
increasing even though the fee should decrease based on economies of
scale. " Even if the market operates efficiently and mutual funds are rational
actors, organizations may find that gains from a failure to disclose or from a
failure to vote proxies in clients' best interests outweigh any potential loss of
revenue or reputation, especially when mutual funds face little chance of being
caught.1
32
126. EASTERBROOK& FISCHEL, supra note 49, at 288. Disclosure alone, however, does not
create value but is merely a means to an end. Disclosure encourages governance activities, and
good governance creates value. See Newell & Wilson, supra note 24, at 20.
127. Howell E. Jackson, Symposium: Revisiting the Mechanisms of Market Efficiency: To
What Extent Should Individual Investors Rely on the Mechanisms of Market Efficiency: A
Preliminary Investigation of Dispersion in Investor Returns, 28 J. CORP. L. 671, 672 (2003)
(explaining that "[u]nder [one] version of the efficient markets hypothesis, the market price of
securities that trade in liquid markets and are well-followed by investment analysts will reflect
all publicly available information on the securities").
128. See Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation: Market
Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851, 853-54 (1992); Lynn A. Stout, Are Stock Markets
Costly Casinos? Disagreement, Market Failure, and Securities Regulation, 81 VA. L. REV. 611,
648-50 (1995) (reporting skepticism on the part of financial economists on the validity of the
efficient market hypothesis). But see Mark Klock, Are Wastefulness and Flamboyance Really
Virtues? Use and Abuse of Economic Analysis, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 181, 194-218 (2002)
(illustrating the numerous ways in which legal scholars have misinterpreted or misunderstood
the efficient capital market hypothesis).
129. John B. Carlson et al., Mutual Funds, Fee Transparency, and Competition, FED. RES.
BANK OF CLEVELAND ECON. COMMENT. SERIES, 2004, at 1 (finding that "[a]lthough it is easy
to identify which S&P 500 funds have high costs and are thus likely to exhibit poor
performance, the high-cost funds persist and even grow - an outcome not consistent with the
competitive market paradigm"); see also Richard A. Ippolito, Consumer Reaction to Measures
of Poor Quality: Evidence from the Mutual Fund Industry, 35 J. L. & ECON. 45, 61-62 (1992).
130. Hank Ezell, The Inside Scoop on Mutual Funds; Costs Can Be Draining, High Sales
Fees, Expenses Represent a Trapfor the Unwary, ATLANTA J. & CONST., May 17, 1998, at 3R;
Steven D. Kaye, Bailing Out of a Biggie, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 7, 1997, at 66.
131. Samuel S. Kim, Mutual Funds: Solving the Shortcomings of the Independent Director
Response to Advisory Self-Dealing Through the Use of the Undue Influence Standard, 98
COLuM. L. REV. 474,478 (1998).
132. See Prentice, Behavioral Observations, supra note 117, at 1414-15 (urging
commentators to examine the assumption that "it is irrational for (investment] managers and
2004]
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The market may not discipline mutual funds, but the SEC can use its
regulatory authority to enact regulations that will protect individual investors.
Mandatory disclosure will elicit the fiduciary behavior that voluntary actions
and market forces cannot. Given the new regulations, mutual funds should
expect that intermediaries will monitor their votes and publicize any
misdeeds.'33 Voting contrary to their clients' interests, then, should lead to a
certain economic loss.'34 The recognition that wrongdoing will result in
financial losses and tarnished reputation should cause funds to modify their
behavior by taking more seriously their fiduciary duties of care and loyalty.
Industry-wide regulations should mitigate conflicts and deter wrongdoing
without sacrificing any one fund's performance. Previously, mutual funds
were likely reluctant to disclose because other funds could benefit from the
information without incurring the costs of disclosure.'35 Further, mandatory
disclosure should have a salutary effect on mutual funds industry-wide by
lessening the likelihood that the mutual fund industry could capture regulatory
interests. 136 Public disclosure removes some of the onus from the SEC to be
issuers to do anything other than make full and accurate financial disclosure to the market").
Professor Merritt Fox's study found that "[i]ssuer choice would lead U.S. issuers to disclose at
a level significantly below... [the] social optimum." Id. at 1416-17 n.90 (quoting Merritt B.
Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice Is Not Investor
Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REv. 1335, 1390 (1999)). Fox further states that economists recognize
the incentive to fail to disclose sufficient information for the successful operation of the
financial industry, and consequently, side with government-imposed disclosure. Id.
133. See infra Part IV.C (discussing the importance of market intermediaries).
134. Although investors may not withdraw from a fund for higher fees or lesser performance,
recent scandals in the mutual fund industry indicate that individuals will withdraw from funds
because of the fund's failure to serve as a fiduciary of investor funds. Josh Friedman, Fund
Firms in Scandal Feel Loss; Companies hadAverage of $10.7 Billion in Investor Withdrawals
in Last Months of '03, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2004, at C1.
135. EASTERBROOK& FISCHEL, supra note 49, at 290.
136. Palmiter, supra note 28, at 1425 (describing mutual funds as "politically up for grabs,
neither captured by nor immune to pressure from the management of portfolio companies"); see
also John P. Freeman, Statement Before the Senate Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on
Financial Management, the Budget, and International Security (Jan. 27, 2004), at
http:llgovt-aff.senate.gov/_files/l12704freeman.pdf ("The SEC's Division of Investment
Management ('DIM') presents a classic case of 'regulatory capture .... ' What we almost
always find when SEC staffers move on are the SEC-honed skills being put to work protecting
the wealth of mutual fund managers .... My analysis of SEC personnel movements.., shows
that most of the SEC's senior personnel who leave the DIM go to work for mutual funds as
officers or directors, for the [Investment Company Institute], or for service suppliers (law firms
or accounting firms) who advise fund sponsors .... When I was working with the SEC in DIM
years ago, I was told by a fellow staff lawyer: 'Let's face it. In five years, we'll all be working
for these guys."').
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the sole investigator of wrongdoing, and provides the market with sufficient
information to regulate mutual funds.
C. Proxy Disclosure Within Securities Regulation
In light of the conflicts of interest and the potential market failure within
the mutual fund industry, the SEC clearly needed to realign the incentives for
mutual funds to maintain their duty of loyalty to their clients. The disclosure
of proxy policies and the disclosure of specific votes, as required by the new
regulations, provides the correct incentives at a reasonable cost.'37 Several
fund companies already disclose this information and prove, through
comparable expense ratios, that making such information available is neither
impossible nor cost prohibitive.'38
As previously discussed,'39 many mutual funds argued against mandatory
disclosure and in support of the role of the mutual fund's board of directors
in complying with fiduciary duties."4 These opponents argued that the
directors would approve the proxy voting policy and monitor proxy voting in
conflict of interest situations. 4' In contrast to required disclosures, such an
137. See Comment Letter of Grant & Shadek, supra note 98.
138. Id.
139. See supra notes 102-110 and accompanying text.
140. See, e.g., Comment Letter of Ronald Feiman, Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw, to
Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (Dec. 6, 2002), at
http://www.sec.govlrules/proposed/s73602/rfeimanl.htm ("The Independent Board Members
we represent believe that... they are capable of discharging all necessary oversight, without
politicizing the process through disclosing every single proxy vote and every deviation from
policy, thereby encouraging special interest groups to lobby regarding particular votes.");
Comment Letter of Zack, supra note 113 ("The proposal's approach to this issue [of proxy vote
disclosure] may be read to imply that boards are not capable of dealing with this type of
potential conflict, or that boards have somehow failed to do so, without citing any evidence to
support those contentions. We believe that this approach undermines the role of the independent
directors in overseeing fund policies and is unwarranted."); Comment Letter of Roiter, supra
note 119 ("[A] fund's independent directors are far better positioned to carry out close and
sustained monitoring of any potential conflicts of interests. Fund directors need not depend
solely upon reports of proxy voting activity received from a fund's adviser and need not
personally pore over proxy voting records in order to carry out their oversight duties.");
Comment Letter of R. Gregory Barton, Managing Director and General Counsel, Vanguard
Group, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (Dec. 5,
2002), at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s73602/rgbartonl.htm ("In Vanguard's view,
enhancing board of directors oversight over proxy voting decision-making would be a far more
appropriate and effective means of achieving the Commission's objectives than publicizing
funds' proxy voting records.").
141. See, e.g., Comment Letter of Roiter, supra note 119; Comment Letter of Ege, supra
note 104.
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2004
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
alternative may address conflicts of interest, 142 but provides no incentive for
the mutual fund to maintain its loyalty to the individual investor.
The SEC's disclosure requirements pull the monitoring function out of the
mutual funds and its sponsor and rely on disclosure to correct the market's
failure to discipline mutual funds. These regulations, like the majority of the
SEC's regulations, are predicated on the expectation that the market has
independent "filters" to digest and interpret the data disclosed under federal
securities laws.143 The proxy disclosure requirement is no different; the SEC
must have envisioned financial intermediaries as the primary recipients for the
raw data on proxy voting.' " Few individual investors would have sufficient
information about each company within a portfolio and the necessary
background data to evaluate a fund's vote. With the cooperation of these
independent filters, the new regulations have the potential to pull mutual funds
into the sunlight.
145
V. Conclusion
The new proxy disclosure regulations are products of a financial market
where mutual funds wield more economic power and impact more individual
investors than the drafters of the financial legislation of the 1930s and 1940s
could have anticipated. The growth of mutual funds, coupled with the
142. Recent statements by the SEC indicate that the agency is no longer as confident with
the role of the independent director as the mutual fund monitor. See Arthur Levitt, Keeping
Faith with the Shareholder Interest: Strengthening the Role of Independent Directors of Mutual
Funds, Speech at the Mutual Funds and Investment Management Conference (Mar. 22, 1999),
athttp://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1999/spch259.htm (indicating that the law's
current requirement that 60% of a mutual fund's board consists of independent directors may
no longer be sufficient to assure investors that their funds are being managed in their best
interests); see also Commissioner Harvey J. Goldschmid, Mutual Fund Regulation: A Time for
Healing and Reform, Speech At ICI 2003 Securities Law Developments Conference (Dec. 4,
2003), at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch120403hjg.htm (stating that "[miaking the
mutual fund board truly independent and effective is where a great deal of the pay dirt lies").
143. Paredes, supra note 119, at 432 ("As a practical matter, a company's disclosures are
largely 'filtered' through experts - various securities professionals and financial
intermediaries - who research and process the information and whose trades and
recommendations ultimately set securities prices.").
144. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
145. In support of the passage of the Securities Act of 1933, Louis Brandeis said, "Sunlight
is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman." Louis D.
BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (1914); see also Louis
Lowenstein, Financial Transparency and Corporate Governance: You Manage What You
Measure, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1335, 1344 (1996) (explaining that "[t]he principle of sunlight-
reflected in the mandated disclosure under SEC rules - works particularly well with respect
to various conflict-of-interest transactions").
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conflicts of interest inherent in their structure, has an impact on individual
investors who delegate their voting rights to mutual funds. Although these
new regulations will have little direct benefit for the individual shareholder,
they will nevertheless mitigate conflicts that may negatively impact
shareholder wealth, and consequently, limit capital expansion.
Disclosure is a relatively simple and cost-efficient way to deter mutual
funds from acting in their own interests, particularly where financial
intermediaries will monitor mutual fund voting on behalf of individual
shareholders. In this way, disclosure will effectively deter mutual funds from
pursuing their own economic benefit when voting client proxies, and instead
will provide them with incentives to vote in the best interests of their
investors.
H. Anne Nicholson
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